Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 4

Article 3

5-15-1988

The United States Government as Defendant - One Example of the
Need for a Uniform Liability Regime to Govern Outer Space and
Space-Related Activities
Joseph A. Bosco

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons, Civil Law Commons, Conflict of Laws Commons,
International Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, President/Executive
Department Commons, Torts Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph A. Bosco The United States Government as Defendant - One Example of the Need for a Uniform
Liability Regime to Govern Outer Space and Space-Related Activities, 15 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 4 (1988)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol15/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

The United States Government as
Defendant-One Example of the Need
For a Uniform Liability Regime to
Govern Outer Space and SpaceRelated Activities
Joseph A. Bosco*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article will attempt to examine potential tort liability for
outer space and space-related activities from the limited perspective
of the United States Government. However, my goal is to illustrate
in general some of the inconsistent liability regimes applicable under
present federal law in dealing with liability to third persons for such
activities. These inconsistencies will be illustrated using hypothetical
examples involving one defendant, the United States Government.
The application of the existing law to the United States Government provides a graphic illustration of the potential inconsistency
and unfairness of the present applicable law in this area. These inconsistencies are due to specific statutory and judicial exemptions,
and a very different liability regime applicable exclusively to nonUnited States citizens damaged, injured, or killed as a result of outer
space and space-related activities involving the United States Government or United States private enterprise. The absurd and unjust results caused by the application of inconsistent liability regimes to the
same disaster are not limited to situations where the United States
Government is a defendant, but can arise in any disaster because of
* A.B., University of Notre Dame, 1979; J.D., Loyola University, 1982; LL.M., Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University, 1986. Mr. Bosco is associated with the
law firm of John J. Kennelly & Associates, Chicago, specializing in aviation litigation.
The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.

varying and arbitrary damage and liability criteria which exist under
the present legal system.
In the United States, there are in excess of fifty different potential
jurisdictions for a case involving a space-related accident, each possessing its own body of procedural and substantive law. Moreover,
the various laws applicable to transitory torts in the United States
are antiquated, outdated, and not attuned to modern-day reality. The
fact is, that in this highly mobile country, wide differences exist
among various jurisdictions in the applicable law governing transitory torts such as plane, train, bus, and now outer space accidents.
The illustration of potential inconsistencies of the existing law's application to the federal government could also, in many respects, be
applied to private contractors, subcontractors, manufacturers, operators, and other potential defendants, in any outer space or space-related accident which results in damage, injury, or death to third
persons unconnected with the activity. This is the root of the problem: varying international, national, and state liability regimes within
the United States legal system which, based upon such arbitrary considerations as citizenship, fortuitousness of place of the accident, or
domicile of the plaintiff or defendant, apply differing liability and
damage criteria to victims damaged, injured, or killed in the same
accident.
As mentioned above, there are wide differences among jurisdictions as to substantive and procedural law. Mr. John J. Kennelly cogently summarized some of the more important differences in regard
to state wrongful death statutes, which could be applicable to deaths
due to outer space-related activities:
In regard to the compensatory damages in wrongful death cases, the statutes of some states permit damages for the mental pain and suffering of the
surviving next of kin, whereas others do not. Some states permit damages for
the loss of society, companionship, services and consortium to the surviving
spouse. Still other states permit damages for pre-death pain and suffering,
while others do not. Some states permit damages for loss of inheritance, yet
others do not. Some states permit punitive damages in both injury and death
cases, while still others permit such damages in injury cases, but not in death
cases. Some states allow punitive damages based upon vicarious liability.
Others require proof of egregious conduct of a corporation at a managerial
level. Some states impose an arbitrary amount of damages for the deaths of
single persons without dependents. Some states allow prejudgment interest,
i.e., interest from the date of death. Even as to those states which allow prejudgment interest, the rates of such interest vary substantially.
There are other patently indefensible differences among the laws of the
states regarding damages in wrongful death cases. Under Florida law, for example, which permits damages for mental pain and suffering of next of kin,
an award of $1.8 million in damages was affirmed for the death of a 16-yearold boy, as a result of the crash of a commercial airliner. Indiana law, on the
other hand, limits the damages in such a case to funeral expenses and nominal
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costs for administering the estate. 1

The particular substantive and procedural laws to be applied in a
case may determine the elements of injury or loss to be used in calculating damages, the amount of recovery, and possibly whether there
will be any recovery at all. Unfortunately, even after a thorough
analysis of the respective substantive and procedural laws of each jurisdiction, there is often no way to predict whether the court will, in
fact, apply such law. Even if a case is filed in one jurisdiction, that
jurisdiction's choice of law rules may direct the particular court hearing the case to apply the law of another jurisdiction. Ironically, lawsuits are often filed in a particular forum in order to guarantee that
another jurisdiction's substantive law will be applied. As a result, in
the case of transitory torts, it is frequently impossible to predict what
will be the applicable substantive law.
Unquestionably, there is something patently unfair about two persons possessing the same types of injuries receiving extremely divergent remedies, simply because of a party's forum choice. Consider a
hypothetical where two men are killed due to the same space-related
accident, with which they were totally unconnected. Each man
earned the same amount of money and had the same life expectancy.
Each is survived by a wife and the same number of children of the
same ages. Yet, under present law, because of such arbitrary considerations as citizenship, residence in one state as opposed to another,
the fortuitousness of the place of the accident, the domicile of the
manufacturer involved, or a difference in the specific occupations of
the men, one family could receive little or no compensation while the
other family receives prompt, fair, and adequate compensation. Unquestionably, reformation of the present liability system is necessary
to create uniformity of remedies in the United States.
Under the present liability system, only participantsin space ventures are adequately protected. The major difference between the
uncertainties of liability toward participants and unrelated potential
victims is that the former group is relatively sophisticated and well
connected. This is evidenced by the fact that most potential space liabilities are enumerated in the risk allocation provisions in contracts
entered into by participants of space ventures. Typically, parties to
these types of clauses are secure in the knowledge that liabilities are
controlled by advance negotiation, and are clearly defined between
1. Kennelly, Aviation-The Need for Uniform Legislation, 48 J. AIR L. & COM.
613, 613-15 (1983).

participants, or more properly, by their respective insurance and reinsurance carriers. Furthermore, private industry has been secure in
the knowledge that exposure to liability is oftentimes controlled by
the fact that in ventures involving the United States Government,
the government has been willing to indemnify any private space participant for liability to third parties beyond that company's insurance
policy.2 In contrast, where do innocent third parties who are damaged, injured, or killed stand with respect to their right to fair,
prompt, and uniform measures of compensation? These people certainly do not have the benefit of advance direct negotiations or
clearly defined contracts spelling out exactly what their recourse
might be. They are forced to operate within the system as it presently exists.
Unfortunately, even though a multilateral treaty, which deals exclusively with international liability resulting from damages caused
by space objects, has been ratified or acceded to by a substantial
number of countries, 3 and even though there is a substantial body of
maritime and aviation law which United States and foreign courts
can easily apply to such torts, the fact is that both internationally and
domestically, the law of tort liability as applied to outer space or
space-related activities is still in an embryonic stage of development.
The existing body of law is inadequate to insure prompt resolution of
claims for damage, injury, or death which would include fair and
uniform liability and damage criteria. While business interests and
advocates of potential victims may disagree as to the specific standards of liability or specific elements of damages which should be
available (each advocating laws favorable to their own self-interest),
all should agree that predictability and uniformity would be beneficial, and that arbitrary considerations should be eliminated.
It is hoped that by examining the potential liability regimes applicable to just one potential defendant, and the inherent inconsistencies and injustices which result from application of these regimes,
that the need for a uniform liability regime will become obvious.
2. See Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (1958) (permitting federal government to provide indemnity to contractor in procuring defense items); see
also National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-48, § 308, 93 Stat. 345, 348 (1979) (allowing NASA to indemnify contractors on
condition that NASA is named as insured on contractor's policy of insurance). However, potential liability to unrelated third parties may not always be able to be managed by contract among participants. Rapid and prolific private commercialization
ventures may lead to a tightening of the reins by the United States on activities in
which the United States Government is not directly involved. This may in turn lead to
"bet the company" exposure every time a private company participates in a commercial space venture.
3. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention]. See Appendix for text of the treaty.
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II.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS AN
INTERNATIONAL DEFENDANT

Under existing international law, which has been adopted by the
United States Government through United Nations Resolutions and
ratification of and adherence to multilateral treaties, the United
States Government is absolutely liable if United States Government
or United States private outer space or space-related activities, which
commence with a launch or attempted launch of a space object, proximately cause damages, injuries, or death to foreign nationals on the
surface of the earth or to their aircraft in flight.4 However, this
broad-based absolute liability regime which foreign nationals are
given does not apply to United States citizens. 5
International law, through multilateral treaties and international
custom, sets forth the well established principle that countries are internationally liable for damages, injuries, or death arising out of
outer space or space-related activities. The first formal proposals submitted by the United States to the legal subcommittee of the United
Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in
1962 essentially advanced this principle.6 International liability was
initially adopted by the United Nations in General Assembly Resolution 1962, entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space." 7
This declaration provided that states must assume international responsibility for the outer space activities of both governmental agencies and non-governmental entities. States which conduct outer space
activities are thus liable to foreign states for any damages which primarily arise from those activities.
This principle was formally adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1963 with little debate. Although there was disagreement between the U.S.S.R. and other countries concerning the commercialization of outer space by private enterprise, these discussions
did not disrupt the adoption of this resolution.8
A similar provision was incorporated into Article VII of the Outer
4. Id., art. II, 24 U.S.T. at 2392, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. at 190.
5. Id., art. VII, 24 U.S.T. at 2395, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
6. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.4, 4 June 1962; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.5, 13 June
1962; U.N. Doc. A/5181, Annex 3, p. 5, 27 Sept. 1962.
7. G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 15 U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
8. Bosco, Practical Analysis of International Third Party Liability for Outer
Space Activity-A US. Perspective, 29 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 298, 302 (1985).

Space Treaty of 1967. 9 Article VII declared that party-states would
be liable for damages caused by the launch, or procurement of
launching of objects, into space. 10 As in the 1962 General Assembly
Resolution, the jurisdiction of the treaty extends to both airspace and
outer space.
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty imposes liability upon partystates for negligent or wrongful acts committed in space, whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities." This principle is embodied and further clarified in the Liability Convention,
which is the main international instrument dealing with third party
liability for outer space activities. 12 It has been ratified or acceded to
3
by over eighty countries, including the United States.'
The Liability Convention seeks to afford victims prompt and adequate compensation by affixing international state liability for the
participation of countries or their nationals in outer space and outer
space-related activities. It provides the legal framework necessary to
impose state liability for damages caused by space objects. Claims are
pursued:
by claimant States on behalf of their natural juridical persons against launching States for governmental, military, and private space activities of their natural or juridical persons which have caused damages. The principal effect of
the Convention is to formally begin the calibration and refinement of the conand procedural law
cept of State liability by establishing a body of substantive
14
governing the rights of launching and claimant States.

The Liability Convention also sets forth an absolute liability regime for damages, injuries, or death caused on the surface of the
earth. While there is room for interpretation in many of the key provisions of this treaty, there is very little which can exonerate or exempt a country from liability to unrelated third persons who are
proximately damaged, injured, or killed on the surface of the earth,
once it has been established that a country or its private persons or
juridical entities participated in or procured the launch or attempted
15
launch of the space object.
The Liability Convention contains a dual system of liability which
begins with the launch or attempted launch. It establishes that a
state is liable for "damages" caused by "its space object," regardless
9.
Use of
U.S.T.
10.
11.

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 206 [hereinafter Treaty on Principles].
Id at 2415, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209.

Id

12. Liability Convention, supra note 3.
13. TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE,
TREATIES IN FORCE 308 (1987).

14. Bosco, supra note 8, at 310 (emphasis in original).
15. See generally id& at 298-372 (analysis of third party liability with an emphasis
on the Liability Convention of 1972).

[Vol. 15: 581, 1988]

Uniform Liability Regime for Space
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

of where these damages are caused. Articles II, III, and IV effectively
encompass all areas in which damages can be caused. The dual liability regime, absolute liability and fault liability, is divided into separate zones of applicability. By dividing the liability regions into "the
surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight" and "elsewhere than on
the surface of the earth," the drafters cleverly avoided the un6
resolved problem of the definition/delimitation of "outer space."1
Article II of the Liability Convention specifies that a "'launching
state' shall be absolutely liable for 'damage' caused by 'its space object' on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight."17 As a result,
a state will be liable without fault or negligence on its own part if
damages arise in these regions. The claimant state will have to prove
that: there was damage; the instrumentality was a space object; the
damage was caused by the space object; and that the state from which
damages are sought "launched" or "procured the launch," or was the
State from whose territory or facility the space object was launched.
Under Article III of the Liability Convention, when a space object
of one state causes damage to another space object, or to persons or
property on board, while the object was situated somewhere other
than on the surface of the earth, liability will be determined by fault
allocation.' 8 Thus, it would seem that negligence principles would be
applicable to entities damaged, injured, or killed in outer space.
Under Article IV, in the event that multiple states are involved in
the accident,
both launching States shall be liable for any damage caused to a third State: if
the damage was caused to the third State on the surface of the earth or to
aircraft in flight, the liability shall be absolute; if the damage was caused to a
third State's space object or to persons or property on board the third State's
16. Id. at 310-11. It should be noted that:
The definition/delimitation of where air space stops and where outer space begins has been debated in COPUOS for over 20 years without a commonly accepted definition. The legal ramifications are significant; this is because air
space and outer space are governed by radically different legal regimes: airspace is governed by Article I of the 1944 Convention on International Civil
Aviation... which states, "Contracting States recognize that every State has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."
Outer space is governed by Article II of the Outer Space Treaty which states,
"Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means."
Id. at 311 (citations omitted).
17. Liability Convention, supra note 3, at 2392, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. at
189.
18. Id at 2392, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. at 190.

space object, then damage shall be based upon fault allocation. 1 9

Joint and several liability shall be imposed irrespective of where the
third state suffered damage. If the compensation cannot be apportioned by fault, then the burden of compensation shall be apportioned equally.20 In short, the third state has the right to seek and
obtain full compensation from any or all states which are deemed
jointly and severally liable.
With regard to elements of damages recoverable under the Liability Convention, no consensus was reached on the formulation of a
body of specific international damage law to be applied. As a result,
only very general rules were formulated. Article I(a) defines "damage" as "loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or
loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations
"21

Article XII provides all the substantive guidance to be found with
respect to damage law:
The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay for damage under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with international law and the principle of justice and equity, in order to provide such
reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is

presented,22 to the condition which would have existed if the damage had not
occurred.

No liability limits have been imposed and any specific elements of
damages have yet to be enumerated. The guidelines presented above
were not, however, intended to resolve all the issues which will arise.
One significant problem is choice-of-law provisions.23 The only guidance given is that compensation will be predicated upon principles
of justice and equity.24 Guidance can be found in the much quoted
and widely recognized decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow Factory case.2 5 Therein it is noted that:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals--is that reparation must, as far as

possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the
situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
26
committed.

19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Id,
21. Id. at 2392, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. at 189.
22. Id. at 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. at 187.
23. Bosco, supra note 8, at 334. See Reis, U.S. Discusses "Applicable Law" for
Outer Space Claims, 62 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 18 (1970) (discussing United States' views of
choice-of-law principles).
24. Bosco, supra note 8.
25. Case Concerning The Factory at C7orzow, 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 17, at 47
(Sept. 13).

26. IM; see also D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW at 596-604 (2d ed. 1976).
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By applying principles of equity, it would be possible to integrate
the differing legal systems. It seems evident that the application of a
mechanistic formula will result in injustice because of the differing
damage recovery laws of different countries. Traditional damage recovery, such as loss of profit, sentimental value, interest, and pain
and suffering, have not gained wide acknowledgement in Soviet and
Eastern European legal systems. 27 The concept of compensation in
the U.S.S.R. is determined based upon "institutional costs (hospitals,
schools, state pensions) rather than personal loss to the individual."28
Accordingly, the results in cases proceeding in fora governed by
mechanistic choice-of-laws clauses, could be very harsh. The same injuries sustained by a person within one jurisdiction could clearly be
"worth more" than those sustained by a person in another jurisdiction. 29 Professor Foster states:
The primary advantage of the use of international law, justice and equity is
that it should ensure uniformity in the assessment of compensation; all who
suffer damage in space object accidents will be subjected to the same rules
governing compensation irrespective of their nationality, the place where the
accident occurs, and the identity of the launching state. In the event that international law should prove deficient or uncertain, recourse may be had to
the "principles of justice and equity," which will normally consist of rules of
general application in the municipal legal systems of the world, to fill the gaps
30
and cure the ambiguities.

A uniform international approach to damage awards would effectively make the awards for damages more equitable throughout the
various jurisdictions. It would have the effect of lowering awards recovered in jurisdictions such as the United States, traditionally
known for their generous damage awards, and raise awards given in
more conservative jurisdictions.
The significance of the formation of the Liability Convention as an
instrument of international law cannot be underestimated. It creates
a practical and workable system of liability which is divided into geographical areas. Its most far-reaching achievement is the imposition
27. Hosenball, Space Law, Liability, and Insurable Risks, 12 FORUM 141, 150
(1976).
28. Id.; see Martin, Legal Ramifications of the Uncontrolled Return of Space Objects to Earth, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 457, 464 (1980).
29. See Bosco, supra note 8, at 338 & n.65. A glaring example is the mass disaster
of 1984 at Bhopal, India, in which a chemical leak at the Union Carbide pesticide plant
resulted in the death of more than 2,500 people and the injury of another 100,000. In
India, victims must pay high filing fees in order to bring suit, and awards are relatively
very low when compared to United States awards. Id. at n.65.
30. Id. at 338-59 (quoting Foster, The Convention on InternationalLiability for
Damages Caused by Space Objects, 10 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 137, 172 (1972) (footnotes omitted)).

of absolute liability upon countries, as well as their private persons
and juridical entities for outer space activities which result in damages, injury, or death to property or persons of unrelated countries.
The imposition of absolute liability is the victim's key to recovery.
Sovereign immunity, act of God, and other such traditional defenses
to liability are nonexistent. However, there is one important exception: Nationals of the launching country are specifically excluded
from the benefits of this multilateral treaty, as are foreign nationals
who are participating in the operation of the space object. Their
rights to prompt, adequate and fair compensation, if any, are dictated
by the applicable national law. Article VII of the Liability Convention states:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to damage caused by a

space object of launching State to:
(a) Nationals of that launching State;
(b) Foreign nationals during such time as they are participating in the operation of that space object from the time of its launching or at any stage thereafter until its descent, or during such time as they are in the immediate
vicinity of a planned launching
or recovery area as the result of an invitation
31
by that launching State.

This clause in the Liability Convention removes from United
States citizens the benefits and protections of this victim-oriented
multilateral treaty, when injuries, damages, or death are proximately
caused by the United States Government or United States private
outer space or space-related activities. United States citizens damaged, injured, or killed as a proximate result of such activities must
instead seek redress under United States national and state laws. To
put it bluntly, they are precluded from the benefits and protections
of the Liability Convention and its absolute liability provisions because of their citizenship.
III.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS DEFENDANT UNDER

UNITED STATES LAW

While a broad-based absolute liability regime is afforded to foreign
nationals under the Liability Convention, as the following analysis
and examples will demonstrate, in contrast, any attempted recovery
by United States citizens against the United States Government is extremely limited. The road to recovery for damages, injuries, or death
from the United States is fraught with barriers, exceptions, and technicalities which substantially limit the possibility of recovery to specific narrowly defined and strictly construed situations. As this
section will illustrate, because of these "exceptions," a myriad of inconsistent and unjust scenarios may unfold when the United States
31. Liability Convention, supra note 3, at 2395, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. at
191.
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Government, through its agencies, is a defendant to a suit brought by
a United States citizen.
A.

Sovereign Immunity of the Federal Government

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot be
sued in its domestic courts or in courts of foreign countries without
its consent. The concept of sovereign immunity did not exist in the
United States until the nineteenth century. 32 Nineteenth Century
courts developed the doctrine relying on the theory "that the King,
in his personal role, was immune from suit";33 in other words, the
King could do no wrong. Over the years, the doctrine has been
eroded by the congressional enactment of a number of statutory
waivers of sovereign immunity. However, because any suit against
the federal government is an exception to the broad immunity traditionally enjoyed by the United States, any waiver of sovereign immunity is strictly construed and riddled with restrictions and limitations.
Consequently, any potential liability of the United States for outer
space activities must be carefully analyzed, not only with reference to
common law tort principles, but also with reference to specific congressional waivers of sovereign immunity.
The waiver of sovereign immunity and the consent of the United
States to be sued can be granted only by act of Congress. 34 Consent
must be clearly, expressly, and explicitly given; 35 such consent cannot be inferred from an ambiguous statute.36 Further, when waiving
sovereign immunity, Congress may impose any conditions, restrictions, or limitations it deems necessary, including "how, when, and
where" the suit may be maintained. 37 These conditions must be
strictly followed and cannot be waived, for they define the jurisdic32. Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh Amendment Right, 58 TEX. L. REV., 549, 551 (1980).
33. Id. at 553; see generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIES §§ 25.01.17 (1958) (discussing wide variety of issues surrounding tort liability of the United
States Government).
34. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1952) ("no action lies against the
United States unless the legislature has authorized it").
35. Malman v. United States, 207 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1953) (action to enforce attorney's lien under army contract; held government consent must be explicit).
36. General Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 352, 354 (N.D.N.Y.), rehg
denied, 207 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1953) (statute allowing suit against federal government
for "money damages" held not sufficiently explicit to recover funds; waiver by United
States could not be implied).
37. United States v. Alberty, 63 F.2d 965, 966 (10th Cir. 1933).

tion of a court to hear such actions. 38
It has been stated that when the United States is sued pursuant to
a waiver of sovereign immunity, it "is in no different position from
any other party." 39 However, an analysis of the statutory waivers of
sovereign immunity and their practical applications reveals that because of the congressional imposition of conditions and restrictions,
the United States can take advantage of a plethora of privileges
which place it in a far more advantageous position than "any other
party" when defending itself. These special privileges also extend to
situations where the United States Government is made a defendant
in an outer space or space-related accident. These privileges exist
even though the United States Government has, by way of multilateral treaty participation, waived many of these special privileges in
space accidents involving foreign nationals.
B.

Waiver of Sovereign Immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act

Perhaps the broadest national waiver of sovereign immunity, and
the most important national remedy for persons suffering injury arising out of the tortious conduct of the United States Government, is
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).40 It gives the federal district
courts:
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages .... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under

circumstanceswhere the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant
in accordancewith the law of the place where the act or omission
41
occurred.

The FTCA applies to claims by United States citizens for redress
for damages, injuries, or death arising out of direct or indirect United
States outer space activities. However, under United States international law, as codified by international treaties ratified or adhered to
by the United States, the United States Government is absolutely liable for injuries, damages or death to foreign nationals damaged, injured, or killed as a result of space activities of the United States
Government, and as a result of space activities of private entities.
There is no comparable right of redress against the United States
Government for injuries resulting from private activities given to
U.S. citizens. Nor is the federal government absolutely liable to do38. Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 41 (1937); Bachman, Emmerich & Co., Inc.
v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (motions to dismiss petitions to recover income taxes granted on grounds that plaintiffs failed to comply with statutory

procedures for actions on claims against the United States); United States v. Acord, 209
F.2d 709 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954).
39. Henz v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 291, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
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mestic citizens. Further, while courts have stated that the FTCA

should be construed to equate the "liability of the United States to
that which, 'a private individual' would have 'under like circumstances,' "42 and while section 2674 of the FTCA plainly states "[t]he
United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
privateindividual under like circumstances.. .,"43 the United States

has enormous advantages which are not afforded to other private individuals or corporate defendants.
1. Limitations on Benefits of Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity in FTCA
Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising pursuant to the FTCA. They are required to apply the "whole
law" of the state where the act or omission occurred which gives rise
to liability, 44 including that state's conflict of laws rules.45 However,
regardless of what the "whole law" of the state is, the federal government retains certain distinct privileges. With regard to outer space
activities, the most important of these privileges is that the FTCA
does not permit claims against the government based upon strict lia-

bility or absolute liability theories such as actions based upon prod-

ucts liability, ultra-hazardous
activities. 46

activities, or inherently dangerous

Negligence must be pleaded and proven.

And even

42. Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1955), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907, modried on
other grounds, 350 U.S. 962 (1956).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) (emphasis added).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
45. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1961). The Court stated, "there is
nothing in the legislative history that even remotely supports the argument that Congress did not intend state conflict rules to apply .... Id at 14.
46. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted that:
The rule announced by the Court today seems to me contrary to the whole
policy of the Tort Claims Act. For the doctrine of absolute liability is applicable not only to sonic booms, but to other activities that the Government carries on in common with many private citizens. Absolute liability for injury
caused by the concussion or debris from dynamite blasting, for example, is
recognized by an overwhelming majority of state courts. A private person
who detonates an explosion in the process of building a road is liable for injuries to others caused thereby under the law of most states even though he
took all practicable precautions to prevent such injuries, on the sound principle that he who creates such a hazard should make good the harm that results. Yet if the employees of the United States engage in exactly the same
conduct with an identical result, the United States will not, under the principle announced by the Court today, be liable to the injured party. Nothing in

though the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been held applicable to
actions brought pursuant to the FTCA, 47 the necessity of proving actual negligence cannot be overemphasized as a possible significant
legal obstacle to recovery by domestic citizens, as compared to the
liberal absolute liability regime extended to foreign nationals under
the Liability Convention.
In addition, the federal government is not obligated to pay prejudgment interest on any award prior to judgment, and cannot be held liable for punitive damages regardless of the degree of recklessness or
culpability of the government's conduct.48 These exceptions apply
even if the applicable state law provides for prejudgment interest or
punitive damages.49 The consequence of precluding prejudgment interest, even when applicable state law provides for realistic interest
rates, is that any delays in litigating the action works in favor of the
government. For example:
[if] a five-year delay occurs between the date of the loss and the date of the
trial or settlement.... claimants may lose as much as 50% of the real value of
the dollars which they ultimately receive (five years later) due to inflation
and the consequent decline of the purchasing value of the dollar. 5 0

Finally, in the majority of cases brought under the FTCA, a claimant
51
does not have the right to trial by jury.
If the FTCA is construed under existing precedent to preclude recovery based on strict liability or absolute liability theories for disasthe language or the legislative history of the Act compels such a result, and
we should not lightly conclude that Congress intended to create a situation so
much at odds with common sense and the basic rationale of the Act.
Id. at 809 (footnote omitted).
47. Provided that res ipsa loquitur is recognized in the jurisdiction whose applicable law governs, then the doctrine may be applied to actions under the FTCA in that
jurisdiction. D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950); Swanson v. United
States, 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964); see generally 35 AM. JUR. 2D FXA, §§ 87-89
(1967).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982); see generally Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. United
States, 471 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (railroad's claim for loss of use of corporate
capital was considered claim for prejudgment interest and thus barred by FTCA).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Prejudgment interest is recoverable in at least 32 jurisdictions and under some federal statutes. For an excellent review of the rates and conditions for recovery of prejudgment interest, see Wilson, Bosco & Malone, Prejudgment
Interest in Personal Injury, Wrongful Death and Other Actions, TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
105, 136-194 (1986).
50. Tompkins, Litigation of an Airplane Hull Suit Against the United States of
America, (pt. I), 27 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 329, 334 (1983).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982). Section 2402 provides that "[a]ny action against the
United States under section 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury, except that
any action against the United States under section 1346(a)(1) shall, at the request of
either party to such action, be tried by the court with a jury." Id. Section 1346(a)(1)
concerns actions to recover tax erroneously or illegally assessed. 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(1982). See Bullion v. Livesay, 83 F.R.D. 291 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (holding that when
United States is substituted into civil action, it is entitled to non-jury trial of all claims
against it); see also Honeycutt v. United States, 19 F.R.D. 229 (D. La. 1956) (holding
that district court had no discretion to grant plaintiffs' motion for advisory jury in
claim against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
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ters occurring in the United States as a result of United States outer
space activities, the result may be absurd, and contrary to any concept of justice and equity. This is illustrated by the following hypothetical example:
The United States attempts to launch a spacecraft into outer space, but, due
to unexplained causes, it crashes in the United States. A & B are both injured
in A's home. A is a United States citizen. B is a foreign citizen. No "negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government" can be
proven. B brings his action pursuant to the Liability Convention where absolute liability is applicable. A is precluded from bringing his action pursuant to
the Liability Convention, 5 2 so he brings his action pursuant to the FTCA. He
is precluded from recovery because he cannot plead and prove any "negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government....-53 B, as
a foreign citizen, may proceed to institute his action through B's country
under absolute liability principles. B recovers from the United States for his
injuries.

Section 1346(b) of the FTCA sets forth strictly construed jurisdictional principles which a party or the court may raise sua sponte at
any time.54 These may provide a further impediment to the domestic
claimant. Under section 1346(b), the acts or omissions complained of
55
must be caused by an employee of the United States Government.
When the acts or omissions can be traced to members of the armed
forces or any number of government employees, this requirement
will be met. 56 However, government-sponsored outer space activities
necessarily involve many private contractors, subcontractors, and
other non-government personnel. Confusion may arise as to whether
a particular person or corporate entity whose act or omission was the
proximate cause of a space-related accident was an "employee of the
government."
Most modern-day courts have found that the issue of federal employment is to be determined by reference to federal law, on the
ground that the states may not decide for the United States who is
52. Art. VII of the Liability Convention states that "[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not apply to damage caused by a space object of a launching State to: a)
Nationals of that launching State ...." Liability Convention, supra note 3, at 2395,
T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) which provides that "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Id.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
56. Id. § 2671. By definition, an employee of the government includes "officers or
employees of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the
United States... and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or
without compensation." Id.

and who is not an employee of the federal government.5 7 While section 2671 of the FTCA specifically excludes "contractors" from the
definition of a federal agency of the government, and thus excludes
them from the scope of the FTCA, that section does not indicate
when a person or corporation is a contractor rather than an
employee.58
Similarly, one may also have to determine whether a specific person is an employee of the United States Government, or an independent contractor. The primary factor is control over the work of such
an individual.59 If the federal government has such control or a right
to control, the person ordinarily will be donsidered an employee of
the government. The mere fact that some entity other than the government pays the individual, or that the government owns the property which the person uses negligently, is not determinative of the
status of that person. 60
Another jurisdictional prerequisite for maintaining a suit against
the United States for loss caused by an employee of the government
is that the acts or omissions complained of must have taken place
while the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment.61 State respondeat superiorlaw is applicable in determining scope of employment questions.6 2 For example, the FTCA
expressly provides that a serviceman, acting in the line of duty, is
analogous to a private employee acting in the scope of his employment under the FTCA.63 Such cases can also be decided under applicable state respondeat superiorlaw. 4
In a suit for damages or injuries arising from outer space activities,
57. Pattno v. United States, 311 F.2d 604, 605 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
911 (1963) (holding that State National Guardsmen were not federal employees under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680). See generally Annotation, Who are "employ.

ees" of the United States within the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 A.L.R.2d 1448 (1958).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Section 2671 states in part: "[t]he term 'Federal agency' includes the executive departments, the military departments, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or
agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the United
States." Id.
59. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976) (citing Logue v. United
States, 412 U.S. 521, 528 (1973)). See generally Annotation, supra note 57, at 1448.
60. See, e.g., Martarano v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 805, 808 (D. Nev. 1964) (fact
that person was compensated as an employee of the State of Nevada did not disqualify
him from status as an employee of the United States Government); Leary v. United
States, 186 F. Supp. 953, 956 (D.N.H. 1960) (fact that non-activated National Guard
lieutenant was paid with federal funds did not make him a federal employee).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
62. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Pursuant to section 2671, "[a]cting within the scope of his office, or employment in the case of a member of the military or naval forces of the
United States... means acting in the line of duty." Id.
64. Berrettoni v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mont. 1967) (applying state
law, found serviceman within the scope of employment).
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it may be very difficult to determine: (1) whether an alleged
tortfeasor was an employee of the government; (2) whether the tort
arose from the actions of a federal agency; and/or (3) whether the
negligence occurred within the scope of employment. Despite these
difficulties, domestic victims and claimants will be required to meet
the strictly construed jurisdictional provisions in order to maintain
an action under the FTCA. Foreign nationals, however, will not be
subject to such burdens; they are afforded a determination of absolute liability whenever damaged, injured, or killed by the United
States Government or United States non-government, or private activities, as set forth under the broad provisions of the Liability
Convention.
2.

Exceptions to FTCA's Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

a.

The Military Personnel Exception

Further, in Feres v. United States,6 5 the Supreme Court judicially
created an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity established
by the FTCA, holding that Congress had not intended to waive sovereign immunity with respect to injury or death arising out of an activity incident to military service. Thus, servicemen, while on duty, are
precluded from suing the United States Government for damages, injuries, or death.
Therefore, in any space-related accident, United States military
servicemen cannot recover damages from the government for injuries
incurred while on active duty. "Active duty" has been interpreted to
encompass those injuries sustained in the course of an activity incident to service, and subject to military orders and discipline. 66 Active
67
duty does not include furloughs or off-duty injuries.
A recent Supreme Court decision, United States v. Johnson,6 8 has
extended this curb on legal actions by military personnel, to include
negligence committed by a civilian federal employee even though
that employee was working in a separate branch of government. The
five-to-four decision overturned a federal court of appeals ruling that
65. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
66. Charland v. United States, 615 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1980) (barring parent's claim
for wrongful death of son killed while on leave, but during voluntary participation in
naval training exercises).
67. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (allowing member of armed services to recover for injuries suffered during activities not incident to service).
68. 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987).

the widow of a United States Coast Guard helicopter pilot killed on
duty could sue under the FTCA.
In Johnson, the widow claimed that her husband's death was
caused by the negligence of a civilian air traffic controller employed
by the Federal Aviation Administration, and thus her action was not
barred under the Feres Doctrine.6 9 The Johnson Court stated that
the military status of the person who allegedly caused the accident
was not the "crucial" factor in such suits. Rather, the doctrine was
meant to "bar all suits on behalf of service members against the Gov70
ernment based upon service-related injuries."
Dissenting Justice Scalia, joined by several of the Court's more liberal members, sharply criticized the Feres Doctrine, stating: "Feres
was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the 'widespread, almost
universal criticism' it has received."'71 Justice Scalia added, "[h]ad
Lieutenant Commander Johnson been piloting a commercial helicopter when he crashed into the side of a mountain, his widow and children could have sued and recovered for the loss." Thus, Johnson
heightens the possible inconsistencies which may occur in an outer
space or space-related accident.
b. The Civilian Federal Employees Exception
Civilian governmental employees injured while on duty are also
precluded from maintaining a cause of action against the United
States under the FTCA. The government provides specific remedies
for injured employees under the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act (FECA)72 and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LSHWCA).73 These statutes contain exclusive governmental liability provisions, and the prohibitions against suit contained
therein extend to relatives or other parties attempting to claim damages through the injured party.74 Section 8116(c) of the FECA states,
"[t]he liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof...
with respect to the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and
69. Id.at 2065. For a discussion of the Feres Doctrine, see IntramilitaryCivil Tort
Immunity: A ConstitutionalJustification, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 301 (1988).
70. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 2067.
71. Id. at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (9th
Cir. 1984)).
72. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-9193 (1982).
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c); see also Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S.
192 (1983) (corporation which sought indemnity for damages arising from crash of aircraft operated by United States Air Force did not fall within the limitations of section
8116(c)). The Lockheed Court held that FECA was intended to "protect the Govern-

ment from suits under statutes, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act ...." Lockheed,
460 U.S. at 194. But this provision must be construed to apply only to persons related
to the injured party.

[Vol. 15: 581, 1988]

Uniform Liability Regime for Space
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

instead of all other liability of the United States or the instrumentality to the employee .... 75
Where FECA applies, the federal employee is precluded from seeking recovery against the United States or a fellow worker.76 The
FECA only provides relief when a personal injury is sustained in the
performance of the federal worker's duty.77 If the federal employee
is injured while off-duty, the FECA does not apply and that employee may seek compensation against the United States under the
FTCA. 78 Therefore, claims for injuries against the United States by
federal employees or their relatives, arising from outer space activities, cannot be pursued if the employee was injured in the performance of his duty.
The possible injustices of judicially created exceptions, which are
determined by such arbitrary criteria as the victim's occupation, are
evidenced by the following hypothetical situation:
Suppose NASA attempted to launch a KH-11 military surveillance satellite
for the United States Air Force. Due to negligence attributable to a NASA
employee, the satellite, while off course is not destroyed properly, resulting in
debris hitting an army base in South Carolina (this base and its personnel in
no way aided or participated in the launch), a United States Post Office, and a
privately owned shoe factory.
Under present law, all non-United States military persons injured as a result of such an accident could sue (or, in the case of death, the executor may
bring suit) the United States Government for the maximum amount of damages available under applicable law. However, United States citizens would
have to plead and prove negligence, while foreign nationals would be afforded
absolute liability. All United States postal employees on duty would be prohibited from recovering under applicable laws, but would have to be content
with recovery under federal workers' compensation-type laws. Any customers
in the post office could institute and recover under applicable law, however.
Customers who are United States citizens, however, would have to plead and
prove negligence under the FrCA. Customers who are foreign nationals
would be afforded the benefit of absolute liability under the FTCA.
All United States servicemembers and federal employees on the army base
on active duty would be prohibited from maintaining suit against the United
States Government, and they and their families limited to relatively minimal
amounts of recovery for any injury, damages, or deaths. Off-duty federal employees and possibly furloughed or off-duty service-personnel injured on the
base, and civilians visiting the base (or in the post office as customers) could
maintain an action against the United States government to attempt to recover maximum compensatory damages permitted by law.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (emphasis added).
76. Gilliam v. United States, 407 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1969), revg 264 F. Supp. 7 (E.D.
Ky. 1969) (holding that FECA was exclusive remedy for personal injuries by deputy
federal marshal assigned to accompany second federal marshal on a trip).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (compensation for disability or death of employee).
78. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

c.

Statutory Exceptions

The FTCA also contains twelve specific exceptions 79 to the government's waiver of sovereign immunity, including, but not limited, to:
(1) the discretionary function exclusion;80 (2) any claim for which a
remedy is provided in admiralty;8 1 (3) "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment .... malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander ....
deceit, or interference with contract [sic]
rights; . . . ",82 (4) "[a]ny claim arising out of combatant activities of
the military, or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of
war";83 and/or (5) "any claim arising in a foreign country."8 4
Although these exceptions are usually asserted by the government
when answering a claimant's complaint, as a practical matter, these
defenses are jurisdictional, and can be appropriately raised at any
time during the litigation.8 5 Foreign nationals are not subject to
these exceptions under the absolute liability provisions of the Liability Convention.
By far the most confusing, controversial, and litigated exception is
the discretionary function exception, which bars:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
86
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

Nowhere in the FTCA is the "discretionary function" defined, and
the legislative historyS7 of the Act provides very little guidance. The
leading case construing this exception is Dalehite v. United States.88
While Dalehite is considered the landmark decision in this area, it is
also the cause of much confusion because of the Supreme Court's unduly broad language and refusal to precisely define the limits of the
discretionary exception. Dalehite involved an action to recover damages for a death resulting from an explosion which occurred after the
Government had loaded ships with combustible fertilizer. The complaint alleged the United States was negligent in its adoption of the
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
80. Id. § 2680(a).
81. Id. § 2680(d).
82. Id. § 2680(h).
83. Id. § 2680(j).
84. Id. § 2680(k).
85. Gilman, Problems Relating to Jurisdictionand Forum Non Conveniens: From
the Standpoint of the United States, 28 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 150, 155 (1984). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not set a particular time limit for challenging subject matter jurisdiction; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

86. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
87. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).

88. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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plan to export the fertilizer, in its contracting for the fertilizer's manufacturer, and in handling the shipment and fighting the subsequent
fire. The Supreme Court held that the case was barred by the discretionary function, finding that the federal employees involved were
following "a plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation
of plan-making authority from the apex of the Executive
Department."8 9
The Court, in discussing the discretionary function exception,
stated that it covers "all employees exercising discretion," 90 and that
this includes the "discretion of the executive or the administrator to
act according to one's judgment of the best course . . ."91 "It also
includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations," 92 as well
as the acts of subordinates in carrying out these plans.93 But the
Supreme Court concluded that the exception did not include, for example, the negligent conduct of an employee in an automobile
accident. 94
While the Supreme Court defined the two extreme limits of the
discretionary function exception, it refused to define precisely where
discretion ends and liability begins. 95 The Court simply stated that
"where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion." 96 The search for a more precise definition of this exception
by lawyers, scholars, and courts, has led to a fertile source of case
law, much of which is inconsistent and confusing.
A majority of courts, however, seem to have adopted a "planning
level versus operational level" test in applying this exception to particular fact situations. 97 The Court in Swanson v. United States 98
provided guidance for the general application of this test:
Although portions of the Dalehite opinion are no longer controlling, the planning level-operations level distinction has been adopted by several circuits

89. Id. at 40.

90. Id. at 33.
91. Id.at 34.
92. Id.at 35-36.
93. Id. at 36.
94. Id.at 34.
95. Id. at 35. The Court stated that "[i]t is unnecessary to define, apart from this
case, precisely where discretion ends." Id.
96. Id. at 36.
97. Blakeley, Discretion and the FAA: An Overview of the Applicability of the
DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act to FAA Activity, 49

J. AIR L. & COM. 143, 153 (1983).
98. 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964).

In a strict sense, every action of a government employee, except perhaps a
conditioned reflex action, involves the use of some degree of discretion. The
planning level notion refers to decisions involving questions of policy, that is,
the evaluation of factors such as the financial, political, economic, and social
effects of a given plan or policy. For example, courts have found that a decior to change the course of the Mission to reactivate an Air Force Base ....
souri River.... or to decide whether or where a post office building should be
built in Madison, Wisconsin.... are on the planning level because of the necessity to evaluate policy factors when making those decisions.
The operations level decision, on the other hand, involves decisions relating
to the normal day-by-day operations of the government. Decisions made at
this level may involve the exercise of discretion but not the evaluation of policy factors. For instance, the decision to make low level plane flights to make
or whether a
a survey,... or the operation of an air traffic control tower ....
handrail should be installed as a safety measure at the United States Post Ofinvolve the exercise of discretion but not the
fice in Madison, Wisconsin ....
99
evaluation of policy factors.

This planning level versus operational level test is relevant in almost every case involving governmental involvement. When a planning level decision has been made, there are operational aspects to
then be carried out; there are also details to be implemented by
subordinate personnel. Once a planning level decision has been
made, the government may then be liable for any negligence in carrying out the decision. In Piercev. United States,100 an action against
the United States under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a
lineworker in an electrical accident at a government ordinance
works, the Court said:
Once the decision was made to construct substations and bring in power, all
of the discretion required had already been exercised. Therefore, it became
the duty of the government and its agents and employees to exercise due care
in carrying out the program decided upon. The complete failure to do so is
outside the protection afforded the discretionary functions already exercised
10 1
and results in liability on the part of the government.

In Indian Towing Co. v. United States,10 2 an action against the government for failure to properly maintain a lighthouse, the Supreme
Court held the United States liable for negligently performing a task
it voluntarily undertook in its discretion. The basis of the holding is
that, while it may be discretionary on the part of the government to
undertake a task, once a task is undertakenand relied upon, the government is held to the same standard of care as private entities in the
manner in which the task is carried out.' 0 3 The determination of reasonableness in this situation is purely a matter of state law.1O4
This rule has been applied in a number of situations. For example,
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
(1968).

Id, at 219-20 (citations omitted).
142 F. Supp. 721 (D.C. Tenn. 1955).
Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
350 U.S. 61 (1955).
Id. at 69.
See Reynolds, The DiscretionaryException of the FTCA, 57 GEO. L.J. 81, 107-11
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once a rescue operation was undertaken, it had to be performed with
due care.' 0 5 Also, once the government had decided to place pilings in
a canal, the government had an obligation to use care to make sure
that the submerged pilings did not damage boats. 106 Similarly, the
United States has consented to be sued for the negligence of its air
traffic control employees in the operations phase of their duties with
respect to the guiding and controlling of aircraft during take-off,
07
while in the air, during landing, and while taxiing at airports.1
From this analysis, it can be surmised that the FAA could be held
liable for negligent acts or omissions in failing to separate aircraft
from or adequately warn aircraft about outer space launches occurring through FAA-controlled airspace. This analysis may also apply
to other governmental agencies which supervise, undertake, and operate launch activities in restricted airspace, such as NASA or the
Department of Defense.
It may also be concluded that if the United States maintains a role
in the separation of outer space vehicles from outer space objects and
debris, in order to maintain safety which becomes relied upon,10 8 the
federal government may be liable for any breach of reasonable care
in the performance of this operation which proximately causes injuries. In other words, if the United States performs space traffic control operations, then the United States may also become the target of
potential lawsuits arising out of any act or omission which is relied
upon and which proximately causes injuries under the reasoning set
forth in Indian Towing.
105. United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955).
106. Everitt v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Tex. 1962) (action under Federal
Tort Claims Act for damage to shrimp boat resulting from negligent failure of Corps of
Engineers to remove submerged pilings).
107. Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972) (wrongful death action
brought by administratrix of decedent's estate alleging negligence of the United States
in failing to warn pilot of bad weather conditions during flight of civil aircraft), affg
Michelmore v. United States, 299 F. Supp 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1969); American Airlines,
Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969) (wrongful death action against the
United States alleging negligence of the Federal Aviation Agency and Weather Bureau
during landing of civilian aircraft); Richardson v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 921 (N.D.
Cal. 1974) (wrongful death action brought alleging negligence of United States employees during landing of civilian aircraft).
108. See generally Covault, Center Set for Soviet Space Monitoring, Av. WEEK &
SP. TECH., Mar. 28, 1983 at 56. Space Command states, "In order for us to keep everything separated in space, we are going to become the traffic cop." Id. at 57. See also
Covault, Space Defense OrganizationAdvances, Av. WEEK & SP. TECH., Feb. 8, 1982 at
21, USAF Lt. Col. William Bowers, space defense director for the Space Defense Operations Centers (SDOC), "likened the current role of the [SDOC] to that of early U.S.
air traffic control." Id,

The United States Air Force, through NORAD/Space Command is
responsible for United States space traffic monitoring activities. l0 9
Collision avoidance is already performed by NORAD for Shuttle Orbiter missions. 110 NORAD performs a Computation of Miss Between
Orbits (COMBO), which is to assure that during the launch, and
while in orbit, there is a safe separation of the shuttle from other objects. A comparison is made between the flight path of the shuttle
and other space objects. A point of closest approach (PCA) is determined, and if a risk appears, the shuttle avoids the risk by
maneuvering."'
NORAD/Space Command has also performed a COMBO for private launches. For example, when the Space Services of America
launched its CONESTOGA I rocket, NORAD/Space Command performed a COMBO to avoid possible collision with orbiting satellites.112 It would appear that while NORAD/Space Command has no
duty to serve as a "space traffic controller," once it undertakes this
task, any failure to adequately monitor and warn about inadequate
separation or any other potentially dangerous situation could result
in liability under the reasoning set forth in Indian Towing.
However, present United States space-tracking facilities are of a
predominantly military nature, with heavy emphasis on national security. Consequently, government attorneys may successfully shield
the United States from liability under yet another exception-the judicially construed "national security" exception of the FTCA.
d. The "National Security" Exception
Various courts have held that the United States Government is accorded very broad discretion in actions which involve national security. An example of this broad discretion is illustrated by the Korean
Airlines Disaster of September 1, 1983, which involved the deaths of
269 people when KAL flight 007, en route to Kimpo Airport, Seoul,
South Korea from Kennedy International Airport, New York, was
shot down by Soviet fighter aircraft."l 3 In subsequent litigation, two
groups of plaintiffs claimed that the United States "negligently"
109. Reynolds, supra note 104, at 107.
110. W. Wirin, The Sky is Falling 3 (paper presented at the Thirty-fifth Congress of
the International Astronautical Federation Colloquium on Cooperation in Space, held
in Lausanne, Switzerland, by the International Institute of Space Law, October 8-13,
1984).

111. Id,
112. A. Dula, The People of the USA and USSR Must Work Together to Establish
Space Industry 323 (paper presented at proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Colloquium
on the Law of Outer Space held in Budapest, Hungary, October 10-15, 1983).
113. During its flight, KAL 007 deviated from its assigned international route of
Flight R20, which it was required to follow after departure from Anchorage, Alaska
while en route to Seoul, Korea. The failure of Flight 007 to adhere to its assigned
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deployed military aircraft in the vicinity of the flight path of Flight
007 and that the government should have utilized its capabilities to
warn KAL 007 that it was headed for danger.114
The United States Government brought motions to dismiss the
plaintiff's actions and to enter summary judgment as to all claims
based upon the United States' providing air traffic services and the
failure to warn of any impending danger. The Government asserted
that these allegations were superseded by national security considerations. 1 5 The court agreed with the Government:
[U]nder the doctrine formulated in the landmark decision, Baker v. Carr,
plaintiffs may not present these claims against the government based upon
the decisions of the military concerning the national security.... To the extent that plaintiffs' claims suggest that the government possesses capabilities
which it could have utilized to warn KAL 007 but chose not to utilize, the
claims shall be dismissed. The failure to adopt a policy to utilize available
equipment and procedures for the purposes and in the manner plaintiffs suggest is a basic policy decision. Since such alleged negligence is not based upon
"imperfectly executing a federal program established
either by an act of Con116
gress or a federal regulation" it is not actionable.

Even though the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
against the United States based upon the alleged deployment of military aircraft in the vicinity of KAL 007 and denied the United States'
motion for summary judgment and to dismiss, the court's reasoning
with regard to national security is significant. Any suit based on the
United States Government's failure to warn of a dangerous situation
in outer space will undoubtedly encounter similar reasoning. Justice
Department attorneys could defend such cases by asserting that any
warning issued by NORAD/Space Command regarding an impending
dangerous situation in space would involve a policy decision:
whether not to warn, or violate national security. The bottom line is
flight path resulted in its passage over the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Sea of Okhotsk,
Sakhalin Island, and the Sea of Japan.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) controlled the airspace over the
Kamchatka Peninsula, the Sea of Okhotsk, and Sakhalin Island. Prior to the occurrence, the U.S.S.R. had published warnings that aircraft flying in that airspace might
be fired upon without warning. The U.S.S.R. dispatched jet fighters to intercept KAL
Flight 007. Flight 007 was struck by one or more explosive missiles fired by U.S.S.R.
interceptor aircraft which caused the craft to crash into the Sea of Japan. See Pearson,
KA.L. 007, What the U.S. Knew and When We Knew It, THE NATION, Aug. 18, 1984, at
105.
114. For an excellent review of possible United States Government involvement in
this tragic accident, see id. at 18-25.
115. In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 18 Av. L. REP. 17,942
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
116. Id. at 17,944 (citation omitted).

that courts are very hesitant to attach liability to decisions of the
United States Government which may involve national security.
e.

The Discretionary Exception

The discretionary exception provides still another shield for the
United States Government. It precludes liability when United States
citizen-residents are injured from an outer space or space-related accident, if such accident was due to "policy level" decisions or for "national security" reasons. 17 These exceptions should undoubtedly be
construed strictly against the United States Government when innocent, unrelated persons are involved. However, further delay while
this "grey area" is being defined are inevitable. During this delay,
prejudgment interest is not allowed to compensate the victims. The
absurdity of this situation is further compounded when one considers
that should foreign nationals happen to be injured, they would be afforded absolute liability under the Liability Convention and do not
have to deal with these nebulous exceptions when seeking redress
from the United States Government for its outer space and space-related activities, or for those of its private agents.
f

The "ForeignCountry" Exception

Another possible defense which could be raised by the Justice Department in defending an otherwise actionable claim against the
United States Government pursuant to the FTCA for torts resulting
from outer space activities is the "foreign country" exception. 118 Legislative history and case law indicate that the rationale behind this
exception is to prevent the United States Government from being
subjected to liability under the law of a foreign power. While the resolution of this issue with regard to the legal status of outer space has
not yet arisen, the underlying rationale for the exception would suggest that outer space will not be construed as a "foreign country"
under section 2680(k), since outer space, per se, is not subject to the
laws of a foreign power and is indeed "sovereignless."11 9 However,
this conclusion is not unchallengable. It cannot be summarily con117. It is uncertain how and whether these exceptions would apply to a space disaster arising from the testing, research and development of President Reagan's proposed
Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars" program. However, any foreign nationals
injured would have no cause for concern, since they would have available an absolute
liability regime, irrespective of these exceptions to the FTCA.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1965) (exempts from FTCA coverage "any claim arising in
a foreign country").
119. See Treaty on Principles, supra note 9, at 2412-13, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. at 207-08. Article II states: "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of
use or occupation, or by any other means." Id.; see also Beattie v. United States, 756
F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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cluded that Congress intended to extend a grant of sovereign immunity to the judicially untested area of outer space, especially since the
area was not specifically included in the waiver of immunity. At any
rate, the conclusion that it was intended to be immunized overlooks
the unlikelihood that outer space was even contemplated at the time
of drafting of the waiver.
Case law interpreting section 2680(k) reveals the actual parameters
of the exception. The courts have interpreted the foreign country exception to apply to torts arising solely in territory where permanent
sovereignty ultimately lies with another nation. However, underlying this "sovereignty test" is a determination by the courts about
whether foreign law governs the tort in question. If United States
law is applicable, then the "foreign country" exception is abrogated
by the courts, regardless of the fact that the actual injury occurred in
a foreign country. A line of cases holds the foreign country exception
inapplicable, regardless of the fact that the injuries or the accident
occurred in a foreign country. These cases interpret the "arising in"
language,120 and conclude that this language directs courts to look to
the place where the act or omission took place in determining the
law where the tort "occurs," not where the act or omission had its
"operative effect," (i.e., where the actual injury or accident occurred).
These decisions hold the foreign country exception inapplicable even
though the accident or injury occurred in a foreign country. Again,
the key to these decisions appears to be a determination of whether
United States or foreign law governs the resolution of the case. 121
This body of cases illustrates that an FTCA claim may arise in the
United States, because the negligent act or omission occurred in the
United States, even though the act or omission had its "operative effect" elsewhere (i.e., the injury occurred in a foreign country). 122
This principle is further supported by cases arising from aviation
crashes occurring in foreign countries. For instance, in In re Paris
Air Crash of March 3, 1974,123 the court held that if the negligent acts
at issue occurred in the United States, but the operative effect (an
120. See supra note 118.
121. See, e.g., Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding a claim
against the United States arising from inaccurate message sent by Chief of United
States National Control Bureau, resulting in wrongful detention of plaintiff by German officials, was not barred by the FrCA).
122. Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying the FTCA to air
crash occurring in Mexico); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732,
737 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (FTCA applied to air crash which occurred in France).
123. 399 F. Supp. 732, 737 (C.D. Cal. 1975).

airplane crash) occurred in a foreign country, the foreign country exclusion had no application. The case arose out of the crash of a Turkish Air Lines DC-10 aircraft in France that took the lives of 346
people. The claims against the United States were based upon the allegedly negligent certification or inspection of the aircraft by the
Federal Aviation Administration. The plaintiffs asserted that these
acts of negligence occurred in the State of California. In ruling
against the United States on this issue, the District Court stated:
Under the FTCA, a tort claim arises at the place where the negligent act or
omission occurred and not where the negligence had its operative effect....
Thus, none of the claims against the United States for death, as alleged in the
124
complaints, is a "claim arisingin a foreign country."'

These "operative effect" cases relate not so much to the definition
of "foreign country," as to the meaning of "arising in." They determine that "arising in" does not necessarily refer to the situs of the
injury, but to the situs of the negligence.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the determination of whether
the foreign country exception applies revolves around sovereignty
over the cause of action-is the cause of action subject to United
States law or the law of another country? Since liability is to be determined pursuant to the law where the tort arises, an action arising
solely in a foreign country would be barred under the foreign country
exception. Consequently, should the injury/damage caused by United
States Government personnel arise solely in foreign territory or on a
non-United States registered space object (which would be subject to
foreign law), then it is possible that this exception will be applicable
to bar suit under the FTCA, absent any underlying negligence by the
United States occurring outside of the foreign country or foreign
space objects. This reasoning also supports the general proposition
that the foreign country exception will not be a valid defense for the
United States when suit is brought pursuant to the FTCA for liability
arising out of government activities in outer space, even when the injuries occur in a foreign country.
In any event, should the foreign country exception be raised as a
defense, even though it is later determined that the negligent act or
omission leading to the foreign accident occured within the United
States, inevitable delay and litigation will again result. The Liability
Convention contains no such "foreign country" exception to the imposition of absolute liability for United States Government or private
United States outer space activities.
IV.

SUITS IN ADMIRALTY

Section 2680(d) provides that the FTCA does not apply to any
124. kd (emphasis in original).
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claim for which a remedy is provided under the Suits in Admiralty
Act (SIAA).125 The SIAA is a waiver of sovereign immunity of the
United States for maritime activities resulting in liability against the
government. Jurisdiction under the FTCA and SIAA are mutually
exclusive. 126 SIAA jurisdiction encompasses admiralty claims arising
on navigable waters that bear a significant relationship to maritime
activity.127 The SIAA generally applies to aviation accidents occurring over the high seas and may also be held to apply to outer spacerelated accidents occurring in airspace over the high seas or on the
high seas if they bear a significant relationship to maritime activity.
In Executive Jet Aviation v. City of C7eveland,128 the Supreme
Court announced what constitutes a "significant relationship to maritime activity" in order for jurisdiction to lie for aviation torts under
federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction under SIAA. In Executive Jet,
an aircraft accident occurred immediately after take-off when the jet
engine ingested sea gulls, lost power, and fell into Lake Erie. The
Supreme Court held that since the aircraft flight was scheduled to
occur entirely within the United States, the sinking of the aircraft on
navigable waters was merely fortuitous.129 The Court formulated a
"locality plus" test in which both the locality of the tort and the activity involved are important.
It would appear that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Executive
Jet would also apply to space torts occurring over or on navigable waters. However, the scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not fixed, but is
restricted or enlarged as the law develops.130 The question of
whether space torts in general are within the jurisdiction of admiralty or civil law is still untested. While it is presently uncertain
whether outer space activities will be considered as falling within the
scope of admiralty jurisdiction, it appears that given the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncement on the dissimilarity of most aviation
torts to maritime activity, most space torts will not be considered cognizable in admiralty absent "a significant relationship to a maritime
125. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1965).
126. Chute v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 172 (D.C. Mass. 1978) (the FTCA expressly excludes from its coverage any claim for which the SIAA provides a remedy),
rev'd on other grounds, 610 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980).
127. See Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1070 (1974).
128. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
129. Id at 272.
130. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1981) (wrongful death actions under the Death on the
High Seas Act); 49 U.S.C. § 688 (1965); 49 U.S.C. § 740 (1965) (extension of Admiralty
Jurisdiction Act).

activity." 131 However, it must be remembered that at the beginning
of the development of aviation in the United States, there was considerable opinion to the effect that "the entire ocean of air surrounding
the earth" was within admiralty jurisdiction. 32 Therefore, all flights
through the air medium were within admiralty jurisdiction. While
this theory never received general acceptance, it is possible that such
reasoning may be attempted by advocates who see advantages in the
application of admiralty law to their particular cases. However, such
a general argument, absent specific facts linking the tort to maritime
activities, appears unlikely to succeed in modern times.
Similarly, these advocates may also assert that Congress has recently extended the federal courts' special maritime and territorial
criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. section 7(6) to include:
Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and on the
registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which is
from the moment when all external doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing, until the competent authorities
take over responsibility for the vehicle and for the persons and property
133
aboard.

These advocates may argue that civil law jurisdiction may also properly lie in admiralty. However, this argument is spurious in light of
the fact that Congress previously extended the courts' maritime
criminal jurisdiction to include crimes committed on board aircraft in
flight over the high seas.134 Civil jurisdiction for torts is still only
proper in admiralty if they bear a significant relationship to maritime
activity.
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Executive Jet135 effectively
separated aeronautical torts from torts related to "waterborne vessels."13 6 Such reasoning can easily be applied to space torts:
...Unlike waterborne vessels, [airplanes] are not restrained by one-dimensional geographic and physical boundaries. For this elementary reason, we
conclude that the mere fact that the alleged wrong "occurs" or "is located" on
or over navigable waters-whatever that means in an aviation context-is not
of itself sufficient to turn an airplane negligence case into a "maritime tort."
It is far more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty to require
also that the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. We hold that unless such a relationship exists, claims arising from air131. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
132. See Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (wrongful
death action resulting from crash of airplane on the high seas); see also 2 AM. JUR. 2D,
Admiralty § 23 (1962).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (Supp. 1987).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1965).
135. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
136. Id. at 268-69.

[Vol. 15: 581, 1988]

Unfor

Liability Regime for Space
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

plane accidents are not cognizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation to
the contrary.
...It is true that in a literal sense there may be some similarities between
the problems posed for a plane downed on water and those faced by a sinking
ship. But the differences between the two modes of transportation are far
greater, in terms of their basic qualities and traditions, and consequently in.
terms of the conceptual expertise of the law to be applied.
For the reasons stated in this opinion we hold that, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, there is no federal admiralty jurisdiction over aviation
tort claims arising from flights
by land-based aircraft between points within
137
the continental United States.

It is important to note that the Executive Jet decision was limited
to flights by land-based aircraft between points within the continental United States. The Supreme Court in Executive Jet stated, and
subsequent decisions have held, that admiralty jurisdiction will still
lie for aviation accidents on international flights over the high
seas, 138 or other aviation activities which bear a significant relationship to maritime activity. Domestic flights between islands or between islands and mainland have been held to fall within admiralty
39
jurisdiction.
From this analysis, it would appear that most accidents involving
outer space activities would not lie in admiralty, but rather in civil
law.140 However, this conclusion has not, as yet, been tested by
courts. Nevertheless, there are certain operations inherent in space
activities which may be deemed to bear a significant relationship to
maritime activities, namely, water-launch activities, splashdown activities, and Coast Guard and Navy safety, reconnaissance, and tracking activities. It is plausible that if an accident occurs during specific
phases of certain outer space-related activities, the SIAA, and not the
FTCA, will be applicable in an action against the federal government
1 41
for damages, injuries, or death to third persons.
137. Id. at 268-69, 274 (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 274; Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1974) (involving airplane crash in navigable waters while approaching air
base in Okinawa on flight between Los Angeles and Vietnam).
139. Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.C. V.I. 1973) (seaplane accident arising over international waters between territorial islands is within admiralty
jurisdiction).
140. See generally Kelly v. Switch, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 969 (1974) (rifle fire from land injuring passenger in boat on Mississippi River is
of sufficient danger to maritime commerce to invoke admiralty jurisdiction); Hyden v.
Krustling, 531 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Fla. 1982) (wrongful death action arising from a landbased, privately owned plane into the Gulf of Mexico was not cognizable in admiralty).
141. See Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1976) (mere fact that land-

Whether an action is determined to properly lie in admiralty or in
civil law could significantly affect the damages recoverable and the
ultimate judgment. The subtle distinctions between law and admiralty would also affect any ultimate recovery for a space-related accident. In any event, because of perceived advantages by Justice
Department or claimant attorneys in admiralty or law, delays will inevitably result while court decisions, appeals, and subsequent court
decisions finally resolve the issue. This will result in further delay in
compensating victims.
V.

CONCLUSION

The inconsistencies of existing United States law and international
law as applied to the United States Government or its agencies as defendants in outer space or space-related accidents which result in
damages, injuries, or death to persons unrelated to the space activities, graphically illustrate the two-tiered approach to liability which
exists today. Under this system, foreign nationals are provided with
an absolute liability regime, while United States nationals are provided with a strictly construed and narrowly defined negligence regime riddled with exceptions and loopholes. The present alternative
liability regimes may lead to confusion and conflicting results. Unquestionably, there is a need for uniformity, consistency, and predictability. Inconsistency, confusion, and uncertainty will inevitably
result in delay through seemingly endless litigation. Outer space activity is here to stay, and in time will certainly increase. Now is the
time to define the laws and establish a uniform process for handling
outer space and space-related accident; not after tragedy strikes, and
the inconsistency and resulting injustice are revealed by application
of the present systems to innocent and unwary victims.
While many of the problems presented in this Article are unique to
the United States Government as a defendant, many of the issues
presented, and many more not presented, could be applicable to
other entities, such as private contractors, subcontractors, operators,
and other potential defendants in an outer space or space-related activity. Of course, these parties normally will have already taken into
account the potential occurrence of accidents by including risk allocation provisions in their contracts among themselves. They will also
undoubtedly procure the necessary insurance and excess insurance
based acts or omissions contributed to drowning did not by itself preclude admiralty

jurisdiction). Contra Teachy v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (unsuccessful Coast Guard rescue attempt of plaintiff from sinking boat by use of helicopter was not function traditionally performed by water vessels, and thus not subject to
admiralty jurisdiction); see also Annotation, What ConstitutesSignificant Relationship
to TraditionalMaritime Activity to Support Federal Court'sAdmiralty Jurisdictionin
Aviation Tort Cases, 30 A.L.R. FED. 759 (1976).
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coverage. These entities may also pursue contractual indemnification
by each other and by the United States Government. The nonparticipant victims of such activities, however, do not have these opportunities; they are limited to what the law presently provides. With
regard to United States citizens, this involves wrangling with a myriad of inconsistent laws, all of which entail different substantive and
procedural rules, and contain varying exceptions to recovery and recoverable elements of damages. Because of these variances, inconsistencies and absurdities will inevitably arise. This, in turn, would lead
to an escalation of litigation costs, delay in the resolution of the issues, and the avoidance of prompt, fair, and just compensation to victims. All of this demonstrates that the application of the numerous
tort recovery systems of various states and countries to a possible
outer space accident which transcends arbitrary state and national
boundaries, and boundaries based on land and water, is absurd.

APPENDIX
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS (The Liability Convention)
Adopted in U.N.G.A. Res. 2777(XXVI), 29 Nov. 1971; 24:3 U.S.T. 2389
(1973); T.I.A.S. 7762; opened for signature 29 Mar. 1972; entered into
force Oct. 9, 1973.
THE STATE PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,
RECOGNIZING the common interest of all mankind in furthering
the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
RECALLING the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION that, notwithstanding the precautionary measures to be taken by States and international intergovernmental organizations involved in the launching of space objects, damage may on occasion be caused by such objects,
RECOGNIZING the need to elaborate effective international rules
and procedures concerning liability for damage caused by space objects and to ensure, in particular, the prompt payment under the
terms of this Convention of a full and equitable measure of componsation to victims of such damage,
BELIEVING that the establishment of such rules and procedures
will contribute to the strengthening of international cooperation in
the field of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes,
HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING:
Article I
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) The term "damage" means loss of life, personal injury or
other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property
of States or of persons, natural, or juridical, or property of international inter-governmental organizations;
(b) The term "launching" includes attempted launching;
(c) The term "launching State" means:
(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a
space object;
(ii) A State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched;
(d) The term "space object" includes component parts of a space
object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.
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Article II
A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation
for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the Earth or
to aircraft in flight.
Article III
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface
of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or
property on board such a space object by a space object of another
launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to
its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.
Article IV
1. In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object by a space object of
another launching State, and, of damage thereby being caused to a
third State or to its natural or juridical persons, the first two States
shall be jointly and severally liable to the third State, to the extent
indicated by the following:
(a) If the damage has been caused to the third State on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight, their liability to the
third State shall be absolute;
(b) If the damage has been caused to a space object of the third
State or to persons or property on board that space object
elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth, their liability to
the third State shall be based on the fault of either of the
first two States or on the fault of persons for whom either is
responsible.
2. In all cases of joint and several liability referred to in paragraph 1
of this Article, the burden of compensation for the damage shall be
apportioned between the first two states in accordance with the extent to which they were at fault; if the extent of the fault of each of
these States cannot be established, the burden of compensation shall
be apportioned equally between them. Such apportionment shall be
without prejudice to the right of the third State to seek the entire
compensation due under this Convention from any or all of the
launching States which are jointly and severally liable.

Article V
1. Whenever two or more States jointly launch a space object, they
shall be jointly and severally liable for any damage caused.
2. A launching State which has paid compensation for damage shall
have the right to present a claim for indemnification to other participants in the joint launching. The participants in a joint launching
may conclude agreements regarding the apportioning among themselves of the financial obligation in respect of which they are jointly
and severally liable. Such agreements shall be without prejudice to
the right of a State sustaining damage to seek the entire compensation due under this Convention from any or all of the launching
States which are jointly and severally liable.
3. A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched
shall be regarded as a participant in a joint launching.
Article VI
1. Subject to the Provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, exoneration from absolute liability shall be granted to the extent that a
launching State establishes that the damage has resulted either
wholly or partially from gross negligence or from an act or omission
done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State or
of natural or juridical persons it represents.
2. No exoneration whatever shall be granted in cases where the
damage has resulted from activities conducted by a launching State
which are not in conformity with international law, including, in particular, the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
Article VII
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to damage caused
by a space object of a launching State to:
(a) Nationals of that launching State;
(b) Foreign nationals during such time as they are participating
in the operation of that space object from the time of its
launching or at any stage thereafter until its descent, or during such time as they are in the immediate vicinity of a
planned launching or recovery area as the result of an invitation by that launching State.
Article VIII
1.

A State which suffers damage, or whose natural or juridical per-
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sons suffer damage, may present to a launching State a claim for
compensation for such damage.
2. If the State of nationality has not presented a claim, another
State may, in respect of damage sustained in its territory by any natural or juridical person, present a claim to a launching State.
3. If neither the State of nationality nor the State in whose territory
the damage was sustained has presented a claim or notified its intention of presenting a claim, another State may, in respect of damage
sustained by its permanent residents, present a claim to a launching
State.
Article IX
A claim for compensation for damage shall be presented to a
launching State through diplomatic channels. If a State does not
maintain diplomatic relations with the launching State concerned, it
may request another State to present its claim to that launching
State or otherwise represent its interests under this Convention. It
may also present its claim through the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, provided the claimant State and the launching State
are both Members of the United Nations.
Article X
1. A claim for compensation for damage may be presented to a
launching State not later than one year following the date of the occurrence of the damage or the identification of the launching State
which is liable.
2. If, however, a state does not know of the occurrence of the damage or has not been able to identify the launching State which is liable, it may present a claim within one year following the date on
which it learned of the aforementioned facts; however, this period
shall in no event exceed one year following the date on which the
State could reasonably be expected to have learned of the facts
through the exercise of due diligence.
Article XI
1. Presentation of a claim to a launching State for compensation for
damage under this Convention shall not require the prior exhaustion
of any local remedies which may be available to a claimant state or to
natural or juridical persons it represents.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a State, or natural or

juridical persons it might represent, from pursuing a claim in the
courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State. A
State shall not, however, be entitled to present a claim under this
Convention in respect of the same damage for which a claim is being
pursued in the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a
launching State or under another international agreement which is
binding on the States concerned.
Article XII
The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay
for damage under this Convention shall be determined in accordance
with international law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to provide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or international
organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition
which would have existed if the damage had not occurred.
Article XIII
Unless the claimant State and the State from which compensation
is due under this Convention agree on another form of compensation,
the compensation shall be paid in the currency of the claimant State
or, if that State so requests, in the currency of the State from which
compensation is due.
Article XIV
If no settlement of a claim is arrived at through diplomatic negotiations as provided for in Article IX, within one year from the date on
which the claimant State notifies the launching State that it has submitted the documentation of its claim, the parties concerned shall establish a Claims Commission at the request of either party.
Article XV
1. The Claims Commission shall be composed of three members:
one appointed by the claimant State, one appointed by the launching
State and the third member, the Chairman, to be chosen by both parties jointly. Each party shall make its appointment within two
months of the request for the establishment of the Claims
Commission.
2. If no agreement is reached on the choice of the chairman within
four months of the request for the establishment of the Commission,
either party may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint the Chairman within a further period of two months.

[Vol. 15: 581, 1988]

Uniform Liability Regime for Space
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Article XVI
1. If one of the parties does not make its appointment within the
stipulated period, the Chairman shall, at the request of the other
party, constitute a single-member Claims Commission.
2. Any vacancy which may arise in the Commission for whatever
reason shall be filled by the same procedure adopted for the original
appointment.
3. The Commission shall determine its own procedure.
4. The Commission shall determine the place or places where it
shall sit and all other administrative matters.
5. Except in the case of decisions and awards by a single-member
Commission, all decisions and awards of the Commission shall be by
majority vote.
Article XVII
No increase in the membership of the Claims Commission shall
take place by reason of two or more claimant States or launching
States being joined in any one proceeding before the Commission.
The claimant States so joined shall collectively appoint one member
of the Commission in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as would be the case for a single claimant State. When two or
more launching States are so joined, they shall collectively appoint
one member of the commission in the same way. If the claimant
States or the launching States do not make the appointment within
the stipulated period, the Chairman shall constitute a single-member
Commission.
Article XVIII
The Claims Commission shall decide the merits of the claim for
compensation and determine the amount of compensation payable if
any.
Article XIX
1. The Claims Commission shall act in accordance with the provisions of Article XII.
2. The decision of the Commission shall be final and binding if the
parties have so agreed; otherwise the Commission shall render a final
and recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good
faith. The Commission shall state the reasons for its decision or
award.

3. The Commission shall give its decision or award as promptly as
possible and no later than one year from the date of its establishment, unless an extension of this period is found necessary by the
Commission.
4. The Commission shall make its decision or award public. It shall
deliver a certified copy of its decision or award to each of the parties
and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article XX
The expenses in regard to the Claims Commission shall be borne
equally by the parties, unless otherwise decided by the Commission.
Article XXI
If the damage caused by a space object presents a large scale danger to human life or seriously interferes with the living conditions of
the population or the functioning of vital centers, the States Parties,
and in particular the launching State, shall examine the possibility of
rendering appropriate and rapid assistance to the State which has
suffered the damage, when it so requests. However, nothing in this
Article shall affect the rights or obligations of the States Parties
under this Convention.
Article XXII
1. In this Convention, with the exception of Articles XXIV to
XXVII, references to States shall be deemed to apply to any international inter-governmental organization which conducts space activities if the organization declares its acceptance of the rights and
obligations provided for in this Convention and if a majority of the
States members of the organization are States Parties to this Convention and to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
2. States members of any such organization which are States Parties
to this Convention shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the
organization makes a declaration in accordance with the preceding
paragraph.
3. If an international inter-governmental organization is liable for
damage by virtue of the provisions of this Convention, that organization and those of its members which are States Parties to this Convention shall be jointly and severally liable; provided, however, that:
(a) Any claim for compensation in respect of such damage shall
be first presented to the organization;
(b) Only where the organization has not paid, within a period of
six months, any sum agreed or determined to be due as com-
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pensation for such damage, may the claimant State invoke
the liability of the members which are States Parties to this
Convention for the payment of that sum.
4. Any claim, pursuant to the provisions of this Convention, for
compensation in respect of damage caused to an organization which
has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article
shall be presented by a State member of the organization which is a
State Party to this Convention.
Article XXIII
1. The provision of this Convention shall not affect other international agreements in force in so far as relations between the States
Parties to such agreements are concerned.
2. No provision of this Convention shall prevent States from concluding international agreements reaffirming, supplementing or extending its provisions.
Article XXIV
1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any
State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force
in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at
any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory
States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall
be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the
Depositary Governments.
3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of the fifth
instrument of ratification.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit
of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Convention,
the date of its entry into force and other notices.
6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XXV
Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to
this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State
Party to the Convention accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and
thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Convention on the
date of acceptance by it.
Article XXVI
Ten years after the entry into force of this Convention, the question of the review of this Convention shall be included in the provisional agenda of the United Nations General Assembly in order to
consider, in the light of past application of the Convention, whether
it requires revision. However, at any time after the Convention has
been in force for five years, and at the request of one third of the
States Parties to the Convention, and with the concurrence of the
majority of the States Parties, a conference of the States Parties shall
be convened to review this Convention.
Article XXVII
Any State Party to this Convention may give notice of its withdrawal from the Convention one year after its entry into force by
written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal
shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.
Article XXVIII
This Convention, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish
and Chinese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the
archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this
Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to
the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

